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This paper aims to conceptualise, for the first time, an implicit form of moral 
disengagement and investigate its role in relation to cheating behaviour. In line with the 
implicit social-cognition models, we argue that the implicit moral disengagement would 
represent an unintentional, automatic and less accessible form of the mechanisms bypassing 
the moral self-regulatory system. We anticipate that in situations implying on-the-spot 
decisions and where individuals might suffer no consequences for the misconduct, the 
implicit moral disengagement would predict the actual behaviour while the explicit moral 
disengagement would predict self-reported conduct. The results of three empirical studies 
provide support for the theorisation of an implicit moral disengagement and its assessment 
through a newly developed implicit measurement procedure using the Relational Responding 
Task. Results of the structural equation models, including both implicit and explicit moral 
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Different theoretical models have been developed with the aim of identifying factors 
affecting individuals’ moral and ethical behaviour (e.g., Ellemers et al., 2019). Bandura’s 
moral agency theory (1991) introduced Moral Disengagement (MD), defined as a set of 
social-cognitive mechanisms that temporarily silence the internal moral and normative 
control, allowing individuals to misbehave without abdicating and thus preserving their own 
moral self. 
Although Bandura acknowledged the potential role of automatic processes1 (Bandura, 
1999), these processes were neither discussed nor hypothesised in relation to MD. On the 
contrary, we believe that an implicit MD does exist and operates together with an explicit and 
intentional form of MD. In line with the implicit social-cognition models (see Gawronski & 
Payne, 2010, for a review), the implicit MD would represent an automatic, unintentional and 
less accessible form of the justification mechanisms. 
The conceptualisation of the implicit MD is timely considering the increasing body of 
literature (e.g., Chugh & Kern, 2016; Reynolds et al., 2010), which suggests that in order to 
understand human moral and ethical conduct, it is insufficient to exclusively consider explicit 
components. Indeed, literature on misbehaviour has attested that this type of conduct can be 
acted outside people’s awareness (e.g., Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Chugh et al., 2005). Some 
authors suggest that bounded ethicality often involves forms of implicit self-serving biases 
that fall at the fringes of conscious awareness (Sezer et al., 2015). 
Conversely, it is essential to also consider automatic components (e.g., Lapsley & Hill, 
2008). Implicit and explicit components are not mutually exclusive, and both could explain 
individuals’ behaviour (Marquardt, 2010; Marquardt & Hoeger 2009; Perugini & Leone, 
2009). The implicit social-cognition models demonstrate that explicit processes better predict 
deliberative behaviours, and the implicit processes better predict the more spontaneous ones 
(e.g., Perugini, 2005; Perugini & Leone, 2009). 





The present research offers a theoretical contribution to Bandura’s moral agency theory, 
and, more broadly, to the debate in moral psychology, by postulating an implicit component 
of MD. Theorising the implicit MD does not imply a claim that individuals cannot be held 
responsible for their actions. Rather, we suggest that the existence of implicit MD may 
acknowledge the potential automaticity of these mechanisms. Acknowledging this and 
empirically proving its impact on misconduct would be consistent with Bandura’s (2016) 
claim that individuals might have variable gradients of awareness and intentionality on their 
behaviour and would offer a more comprehensive theorisation of moral functioning. 
Furthermore, this manuscript offers a methodological contribution by presenting a newly 
developed valid and reliable MD implicit measure. In doing so, we capitalise on the extensive 
literature on implicit measures, and in particular, on the Relational Responding Task (RRT; 
De Houwer et al., 2015). This also contributes to addressing the exclusive use of self-report 
measures in moral psychology, raised as a highly critical element in a recent literature review 
(Ellemers et al., 2019). By presenting an implicit measure of MD, we do not seek to 
undermine the value of existing self-report assessment tools. Rather, we agree with Nosek 
and colleagues’ (2011, p. 155) claim that ‘neither implicit nor explicit measures have an 
advantage in being the “truer” measure of one’s thoughts and feelings (…); both are valid 
assessments of unique aspects of social-cognition’. 
This paper includes three studies describing the development and validation of an 
implicit MD measure (Study 1, 2 and 3), and testing whether and how explicit and implicit 
MD work differently in relation to cheating behaviour (Study 2 and 3). In line with the 
implicit social-cognition models and previous studies on automatic processes in the moral 
domain (e.g., Perugini, 2005; Perugini & Leone, 2009), we expected the implicit MD to 
better predict the actual misconduct and the explicit MD to predict the self-reported one. 





Since MD measures must be tailored to one specific domain (Bandura 2016), we focused on 
academic cheating behaviours, given MD is an important predictor (e.g., Fida et al., 2018). 
 
 
The Unexplored Implicit Side of Moral Disengagement 
 
Bandura highlighted that people can keep their conduct in line with their principles and 
systems of norms due to their self-regulatory capabilities. However, the self-regulatory moral 
system does not ensure behavioural consistency. Indeed, moral control could be selectively 
‘deactivated’ by MD (Bandura, 1991), allowing the self-regulatory moral system to be 
bypassed. Studies have consistently supported that the more individuals morally disengage 
the more they misbehave (e.g., Fida et al., 2018; Newman et al., 2019). 
MD has been invariably conceptualised and operationalised as an explicit construct. 
Although Bandura acknowledges that human action ‘contains both cognitively guided and 
automatic aspects as well as top-down and bottom-up processing’ (2008, p. 114), he has 
never theorised, operationalised and investigated an implicit MD component. In line with the 
literature on social-cognition (De Houwer, 2014; Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004) and the current debate on bounded ethicality (e.g., Chugh & Kern, 2016), we 
believe that this component exists and needs to be assessed. 
Implicit MD may capture the justification processes that might have been learnt and 
routinised over time (e.g., Hyde et al., 2010; Paciello et al., 2008), and this could operate 
automatically. It would represent not only a ‘footprint’ left by past personal experiences of 
morally disengaging but also the ‘mark’ left by the repeated exposure to specific social 
models and situations. If we assume that the self-system is an organised structure of 
knowledge in which processes can operate at both implicit and explicit levels (Payne & 
Gawronsky, 2010), the implicit MD is the strength of the automatic self-absolving processes 





that are available to individuals and that might make their engagement in misconduct more 
likely. 
Accepting the existence of an implicit MD sets a challenge in its assessment. MD has 
been invariably measured using self-report scales. However, ‘people are highly motivated to 
protect their self-views of being a moral person’ (Ellemers et al., 2019, p3). Hence, when 
completing a self-report measure of MD, individuals may respond untruthfully in an attempt 
to preserve their moral image and what they want to project externally. Research on moral 
psychology has mostly relied on self-report measures (Ellemers et al., 2019), which can only 
partially assess moral processes and are unable to capture implicit ones (Chugh et al., 2005; 
Perugini & Leone, 2009; Sezer et al., 2015). If we recognise the impact of previous 
sedimented experiences and of tacit vicarious learning in relation to MD, we need to resort to 
implicit measures to access content that would otherwise not be captured by any self-report 
assessment strategies. 
Implicit Social-cognition and Morality 
 
Over the last few decades, implicit social-cognition models have suggested the 
distinction between implicit and explicit processes (Gawronski & Payne, 2010). The former 
are described as unintentional, unaware, spontaneous, associative and requiring little 
cognitive effort. It has been suggested that they are based on mental associations, namely 
simple mnemonic links between specific target-categories and specific attributes which can 
be activated without deliberative effort (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). In contrast, 
explicit processes are described as intentional, aware, deliberative, and propositional, and 
require high levels of attention. They are perceived as propositional judgements based on 
reflexive processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Different experimental paradigms were developed to measure automatic mental 
associations (De Houwer & Moors, 2010). Among these, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 





Greenwald et al., 1998) is considered the most used and tested. The IAT is a computer- 
administered task designed to measure the strength of automatic mental associations between 
two opposing target concepts (e.g., Self vs. Others) and two opposing attributes (e.g., Honest 
vs. Dishonest). In each trial, participants are instructed to categorise a stimulus (e.g., a word 
or an image) as quickly and accurately as possible into the two possible target categories and 
two possible attributes (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
Notwithstanding the important role of IAT measures in predicting actual behaviour, this 
type of instrument can only measure the mere automatic associations between two target- 
categories (e.g., Self vs. Others) and two attributes (e.g., Honest vs. Dishonest), without 
considering the possible different relationships between them (De Houwer, 2014). For 
instance, an automatic association between Self and Honest may be interpreted by applying 
different logical relationships such as ‘I am honest’ or ‘I should be honest’. Several authors 
have recently suggested that implicit evaluations depend on an automatic activation of 
propositions and not on automatic mental associations (e.g., De Houwer, 2014), as proposed 
in the classical dual models. In the classical dual models, propositional evaluations are 
conceived as intrinsically reflective and separated from implicit processes that are based on 
automatic associative activation (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004). De Houwer (2014) showed 
that propositional evaluations can be formed (e.g., Heider et al., 2015) and retrieved 
automatically. Hence, to develop an implicit measure of MD, we relied on instruments that 
included statements as stimuli that captured implicit propositional evaluations. 
Other models have suggested different explanations for the relationships of implicit vs. 
explicit measures on spontaneous vs. deliberative behaviours (e.g., Perugini, 2005). Examples 
include the so-called additive and double dissociation models. The former assumes that 
implicit and explicit measures can provide unique contributions in the prediction of both 
behaviours (e.g., Perugini et al., 2010). However, it has also been demonstrated that in some 





cases, only one measure (implicit or explicit) offers an additive unique contribution to both 
type of behaviours (i.e, partial dissociation model, see Perugini, 2005). The double 
dissociation model assumes that implicit measures are expected to predict only spontaneous 
behaviours, whereas explicit measures are expected to predict only deliberative ones. 
To the best of our knowledge only one research paper has investigated the role of both 
implicit and explicit processes in explaining moral behaviour (i.e, Perugini & Leone, 2009). 
Specifically, they applied the IAT to measure moral self-concept and showed that while the 
implicit moral self-concept significantly predicted the actual moral behaviour, the explicit 
measure did not. 
 
 
The Development of an Implicit Moral Disengagement Measure 
 
When developing the implicit MD measure, we acknowledged the limitations of using 
the IAT. Using, for instance, Cheating vs. Not-cheating as attributes and Self vs. Others as 
targets would have resulted in the assessment of a form of self-identity, rather than MD. MD 
refers to the mechanisms that restructure the misconduct by focusing on those conditions that 
might legitimate it (e.g., cheating when everyone does it). An implicit measure of MD should 
assess the automatic processes associated with misconduct under certain circumstances. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the IAT is designed to capture automatic associations 
between concepts while ignoring the way in which those concepts are related (see Hughes et 
al., 2012, for a detailed overview). For instance, whereas both the propositional beliefs I 
cheat and I legitimate cheating involve a relationship between the categories I and cheat, they 
substantially differ in terms of the type of relationship, and IAT cannot differentiate between 
them. 
To overcome these limitations, we used a different latency-based experimental 
paradigm, that is the RRT (De Houwer et al., 2015), which measures not mere automatic 





associations, but implicit beliefs, including the relational information between target 
categories and attributes (for an overview, see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Propositions are 
different from automatic associations, as they contain relational information about how 
concepts are related with each other (e.g., Hughes & Barnes-Homes, 2013; De Houwer, 
2014). 
One of the essential characteristics of the RRT is the requirement to respond in line with 
specific situational beliefs. The process involves the presentation of a series of statements in 
the middle of a computer screen, and participants are instructed to categorise them, as quickly 
as possible, as if they agree with certain statements and disagree with others. For instance, in 
a first block (see Figure 1, Panel a), participants are asked: a) to select Right when presented 
with statements that imply the moral views of the behaviour (e.g., ‘It is serious to cheat even 
if no one is damaged’); and b) to select Wrong when presented with statements that imply the 
unmoral views of the behaviour (e.g., ‘It is not serious to cheat if no one is damaged’). In a 
second block (see Figure 1, Panel b), they are asked to respond in the opposite manner: a) 
select Right when presented with the unmoral statement and b) select Wrong when presented 
with the moral statement. Reflective of the IAT scoring algorithm, the difference in the mean 
response latency between these two blocks of trials is assumed to provide a measure of the 
extent to which participants morally (dis)engage. 
Similarly to IAT, RRT requires to categorise stimuli as quickly and accurately as 
possible. As such, they capture automatic components, rather than participants’ introspective 
processes (De Houwer & Moors, 2010). However, while RRT measures implicit 
propositional knowledge, IAT only measures automatic associations. Hence, RRT and IAT 
measure different constructs that may or not be reciprocally related. To date, different studies 
have used RRT to measure implicit beliefs, such as prejudice (De Houwer et al., 2015), 
parenting beliefs (Koning et al., 2016), desire to smoke (Tibboel et al., 2017), actual vs. ideal 





body image (Heider et al., 2018), alcohol self-identity (Cummins et al., 2020) and self-esteem 
(Dentale et al., 2020). These studies provided evidences of RRT reliability and validity. A 
recent study (Dentale et al., 2020) demonstrated that, similar to the IAT, the RRT is 
consistently less prone to faking effects with respect to self-report measures. To the best of 
our knowledge, the RRT has never been used to study morality. 
 
 






The specific aim of this study was to present the development of an implicit MD 
measure and to initially test its psychometric properties. We focused on the academic context 
because MD has been recognised as an important factor predicting cheating behaviour (Fida 
et al., 2018). This is a type of misconduct that can take different forms and is extremely 





Participants and Procedure 
 
We determined a priori the final sample size in order to achieve a minimum level of 
reliability of the implicit measures proposed in this preliminary study. Since IAT split-half 
coefficients generally range between .60 and .90 (see LeBel & Paunonen, 2011), we set this 
.60 as the minimum acceptable level of internal consistency and estimated the minimum 
sample size (for a two-tailed α=.05 and with 80% of power) accordingly. Since the split-half 
correlation coefficient represents a special case of Cronbach’s alpha (see Lord & Novick, 
1968), we determined our sample size by using the formula devised by Bonett (2002, 
Equation 5). Results indicated that the minimum sample size was 52 participants. 





Participants were psychology students. One of the authors presented the research project 
during a research method class. Interested students left their contact information and were 
later contacted by a research assistant. After signing the informed consent previously 
approved by the Ethical Review Board of the Department to which the second author is 
affiliated, participants completed anonymously the two implicit measures described below. 
Students’ participation was completely voluntary and was rewarded with course credits. 
Overall, 70 students (30 males and 40 females) with a mean age of 20.21 years old (SD=2.30) 
participated in the study. The final sample size was constant across different analyses. 




The measures used in this study were collected along with others (personality traits, self- 
efficacy for self-regulated learning, Machiavellianism, academic citizenship behaviours) not 
relevant for the present paper. All measures, manipulations and exclusions are reported. 
Academic Cheating Behaviour Implicit Association Test (ACB-IAT). Participants 
performed both single and combined categorisation tasks, using 5 stimuli-words for each 
category that were presented in a randomised order within each block of trials. The labels 
used in the target categorisation task were: Self (stimuli: me, my, I, self, mine) vs. Others 
(stimuli: others, their, them, they, those) whereas the labels for the attribute categories were 
Respecting Rules (following, conforming, adhering, respecting, complying) vs. Breaking 
Rules (deceiving, breaking, cheating, violating, tricking). The overall procedure consisted of 
seven blocks of trials: a single target categorisation task (e.g., Self vs. Others, 20 trials), a 
single attribute categorisation task (e.g., Respecting Rules vs. Breaking Rules, 20 trials), an 
initial combined categorisation task (e.g., Self or Respecting Rules vs. Others or Breaking 
Rules; two sub-blocks of 20 and 40 trials respectively), a single target categorisation task 
reversed (e.g., Others vs. Self, 40 trials) and a second combined categorization task (e.g., 





Others or Respecting Rules vs. Self or Breaking Rules; two sub-blocks of 20 and 40 trials, 
respectively). The order of the two combined blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Data from the combined blocks were used to compute the D scores, according to the built-in 
error penalty scoring procedure (Greenwald et al., 2003). More positive scores indicate a 
higher association between Self and Breaking Rules. 
Implicit Academic Moral Disengagement Relational Responding Task (AMD-RRT). We 
developed two parallel sets of target items drawing on previous work on academic MD 
(Farnese et al., 2011; Fida et al., 2018). Specifically, we first developed five statements 
related to MD in relation to a range of cheating behaviour (e.g., copying, giving hints). Then, 
for each of them we worded a corresponding statement of moral engagement (see Table 2 for 
the full set of items). The set of 10 attributes were developed as synonymous of ‘Right’ (i.e, 
legitimate, licit, correct, acceptable, right) and ‘Wrong’ (i.e, illegitimate, illicit, incorrect, 
inacceptable, wrong). The AMD-RRT consisted of seven blocks. During the first block (20 
trials), participants were presented with the 10 synonymous of ‘Right’ or ‘Wrong’. Each of 
these words (hereafter referred to as ‘inducer words’) were presented twice in a random order 
in an orange font. During the second block (20 trials), participants were presented with the 10 
target statements (MD and moral engagement). Each of these statements was presented twice 
in a random order in a blue font. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible to these statements in a manner that would reflect moral engagement (i.e, to judge 
moral engagement statements as ‘Right’ and MD statements as ‘Wrong’). During the third 
(40 trials) and fourth (40 trials) blocks, all stimuli were presented twice, either in orange (i.e, 
attribute words) or in blue (i.e, target statements). Participants were asked to correctly 
categorise the attribute words and to respond to the target statements as if they endorsed 
moral engagement. During the fifth block (20 trials), each of the target statements was again 
presented twice in a blue font. Participants were now asked to respond to these statements in 





a manner consistent with MD. Finally, during the sixth (40 trials) and seventh (40 trials) 
blocks, all statements were again presented twice, either in orange (i.e, attribute words) or in 
blue (i.e, target statements). Participants were asked to correctly categorise the attribute 
words and to respond to the target statements as if they endorsed MD. During the 
administration of the AMD-RRT, the response labels ‘Wrong’ and ‘Right’ were presented at 
the top left and top right corner of the computer screen, respectively. All statements were 
presented in the middle of the computer screen until a response was registered. Incorrect 
responses resulted in the presentation of a red cross in the lower half of the computer screen 
until participants gave the appropriate response. The subsequent trial then began after an 
interval of 750 ms. Response latencies exceeding the cut-off value of 10,000 ms were thus 
excluded. Subjects with more than 10% of response latencies faster than 300 ms were 
deleted. The AMD-RRT data were scored using the D1 algorithm, after exclusion of all data 
stemming from practice and induction trials (see De Houwer et al., 2015). The final AMD- 
RRT scores were computed so that higher scores reflected higher levels of implicit MD. 
Data Analysis 
We examined descriptive statistics and evaluated the reliability in terms of internal 
consistency (split-half Spearman-Brown corrected coefficients). We examined average 
latencies and error percentages of both implicit measures together with the zero-order 
correlation among ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT. 
Results 
 
Average latencies and error percentages are presented in Table 1 and 2. Values observed 
for the ACB-IAT items were in line with those observed with the most commonly used IAT 
measures in the literature. Participants took approximately five minutes on average (SD=1.5) 
to complete AMD-IAT. Although error percentages of AMD-RRT were in line with the 
values observed in other studies, latencies associated with its stimuli may be problematic. 





Indeed, their averages ranged between approximately 2084 to 2500 ms, much higher than 
those observed in the initial validation study conducted by De Houwer et al. (2015). This 
could have been the result of the excessive length of the AMD-RRT stimuli, that has been 
also reported as an issue by several participants after the session. 
In terms of internal consistency, split-half reliability coefficients for the ACB-IAT and 
the AMD-RRT were, respectively, .64 and .77. No significant association was found between 
implicit measures and their respective average latency and error percentage, and ABC-IAT 
and AMD-RRT total scores were substantially independent (r=-.08, p>.05). 
 
 






This preliminary study aimed to pilot and calibrate our implicit measures. The results 
showed that both measures were reliable, especially considering the level of internal 
consistency generally exhibited by implicit measures (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). However, 
AMD-RRT average latencies showed much higher values than those observed in other 
studies (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2015). This may indicate that, as indeed reported by several 
participants, sentences used as stimuli were too long, and high average latencies can be 
interpreted as a sign of excessive difficulty in completing the AMD-RRT. Hence, although 
the newly developed measure seemed quite promising, a revision of the stimuli was necessary 
to make them less verbose and easier to process. 
Study 2 
 
Drawing on the results of Study 1, the aim of Study 2 is twofold: 1. to revise the AMD- 
RRT measure by making the stimuli less verbose and complex (e.g., avoiding double 
negatives); 2. to examine the criterion and incremental validity of the revised AMD-RRT 





against its ‘explicit’ counterpart (i.e, explicit academic MD), on both self-reported cheating 
behaviour and the ‘actual’ lie behaviour. Consistent with previous literature (Perugini & 
Leone, 2009), we hypothesised a double dissociation pattern of association, with the implicit 
MD significantly associated only with the ‘actual’ lie behaviour and the explicit MD 
significantly associated only with the self-reported cheating behaviour. 
Methods 
 
Procedure and Participants 
 
Participants were university psychology students. Their participation was completely 
voluntary and was rewarded with course credits. The final sample comprised 65 participants 
(73.5% females) with a mean age of 21.8 years (SD=1.4). Final sample size was constant for 
all analytic purposes, and no participants were added after the data collection phase. Sample 
size was determined before any data analysis. Participants anonymously completed both 
implicit and explicit measures in a laboratory setting. Prior to each session, they were 
informed of the general aims of the study by trained research assistants. Moreover, they 
signed the informed consent previously approved by the Ethical Review Board of the 
Department to which the second author is affiliated. Consistent with Schmukle and Egloff 
(2005), implicit measures were administered first to reduce potential carry-over effects, since 
they require less conscious engagement than explicit ones. 
Measures 
 
The measures used in this study were collected along with others not relevant for the 
present paper. All measures, manipulations and exclusions are reported. 
Academic Cheating Behaviour Implicit Association Test (ACB-IAT). It was the same as the 
one described in Study 1. 
Academic Moral Disengagement Relational Responding Task (AMD-RRT). This task was 
the same as Study 1. However, to overcome the limitations highlighted in Study 1, its stimuli 





were revised to simplify the wording. The full list of the revised statements is presented in the 
Table 3. 
Explicit Academic Moral Disengagement. This scale comprised 18 items (adapted from 
Farnese et al., 2011) assessing students' proneness to engage in different forms of academic 
misconduct. Participants reported their agreement with each item on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale (from 1=not agree at all to 5=completely agree). The items of this scale were split into 
two test halves by balancing their corrected item-total correlations for further analytic 
purposes (Little et al., 2013). 
Explicit Academic Cheating Behaviours. This scale comprised 9 items (adapted from 
Farnese et al., 2011) describing different academic cheating behaviours. Participants reported 
the frequency of engaging in such behaviour during their academic career on a 5-point Likert- 
type scale (from 1=never or almost never to 5=most of the times or always). This measure 
serves as the deliberative outcome of the present study. 
Actual Lie Behaviour. An ad hoc measure based on the Over-Claiming Technique 
originally proposed by Phillips and Clancy (1972) was developed for the present study. 
Specifically, students were asked to report their familiarity on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
(from 0=I never heard of it to 4=I know it very well) with 35 notions equally divided into 7 
psychology sub-disciplines (five notions per group). Notions included popular authors, 
theories, topics and scientific terms that students were supposed to know based on their past 
courses attended during their bachelor’s degree. Within each sub-discipline, four notions 
were true (i.e, they actually exist) and one notion was completely invented. We opted for this 
task because we intended to elicit a spontaneous and not morally connotated behaviour. 
Indeed, it was designed to avoid any constraints, effort or premeditation: it was anonymous, 
there was no expected evaluation, there were no evident benefits to gain or lose, participants 





were not explicitly asked to be honest. Overall, this task was designed to create a setting with 
low risks in terms of potential impact on participants’ self-image. 
The scoring of the task would imply the use of formulae devised by signal detection 
theory (Paulhus et al., 2003). However, the use of such a scoring method requires strong 
assumptions, including the mutual independence between familiarity ratings with signal trials 
(i.e, true notions) and noise trials (i.e, false notions), as well as their univariate normality that 
are hardly met (on this topic, see Goecke et al., 2020). In our case it is in fact plausible to 
expect that students may overclaim their familiarity with both true and false notions by 
activating motivated response biases (e.g., impression management). To overcome these 
limits, we preferred to adopt a two-phased strategy aimed to operationalise the substantive 
spontaneous criterion. First, we calculated two continuous scores: 1) overall familiarity with 
the true notions (i.e, the number of hits, Paulhus, 2012), 2) overall familiarity with the false 
notions (i.e, the number of false alarms, Paulhus, 2012). Second, we control the familiarity 
with the false notions for the familiarity with the true notions with a model-based strategy 
(see below). By doing so, we removed from the former the variability attributable to 
motivated response biases shared with the latter. Thus, we interpreted our substantive 
criterion as the actual lie behaviour partialled out from possible motivated response biases. 
Data Analysis 
 
As a first step, descriptive statistics and reliability of the study variables were 
investigated. The reliability was assessed with Spearman-Brown coefficient (Eisinga et al., 
2013) for ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT (not being measured by multiple items), and with 
Cronbach's alpha for the other measures. 
In line with our hypotheses, a structural equation model (SEM) was tested (see Figure 
2). Following Gawronski & Bodhenausen (2006) and Perugini et al. (2010) we specified an 
additive pattern comprising direct effects of explicit (i.e, academic MD) and implicit 





measures (i.e, ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT) on both self-report (i.e, cheating behaviours) and 
actual cheating behaviours (i.e, overall familiarity with false notions of the over-claiming 
measure partialled out from the overall familiarity with true notions). 
We defined three exogenous latent variables by two test halves each (i.e, explicit 
academic MD, ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT). To favour the model identification, residual 
variances among test halves of the same latent construct were constrained to equality, while 
all factor loadings were fixed to unity. In addition, a latency composite variable was defined 
by creating a single weighted linear component (by means of principal component analysis) 
based on the reaction times in both ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT (e.g., Möcks, 1986). This 
composite score was used as a control variable for both criteria, and it was specified as 
oblique with respect to all exogenous latent variables of the model. 
Overall model fit was evaluated with multiple indices: (i) χ2 test; (ii) Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA); (iii) Comparative Fit Index (CFI); (iv) Tucker-Lewis or 
Non-Normed Fit Index (TLI or NNFI) and (v) Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual 
(SRMR). In line with commonly accepted cut-offs (e.g., Kline, 2016), models with satisfying 
fit should have RMSEA≤.08, CFI and TLI≥.90, and SRMR≤.08. 
Finally, due to the novelty of this study, no prior knowledge regarding the effect sizes in 
terms of the impact of our implicit and explicit measures on the criterion variables was 
available. For this reason, we conducted a sensitivity power analysis with the software 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) in order to calculate the minimum detectable effect size (MED) 
for each structural regression coefficient. We adopted 1 – β=.80 as power criterion (for a one- 
tailed level of α=.05). 











Table 3 presents the average latencies and error percentages of the revised AMD-RRT 
stimuli. As expected, average latencies were much lower than those observed in Study 1, 
suggesting that trials were perceived as easier. This result may indicate that the AMD-RRT 
used in Study 2 reduces the possibility of a flattening effect between critical blocks due to the 
prevalence of a cautious style of response, increasing the validity of the task. 
No missing data were detected in any study variables. Table 4 shows the descriptive 
statistics, while those pertaining to test halves defining the exogenous latent variables are 
provided in Table S1. Explicit academic cheating behaviours showed a slight positive 
skewness, whereas the familiarity with truly existent notions from the over-claiming measure 
showed a similar skewness in the opposite direction of the frequency distribution. For these 
reasons, parameters of the further SEM were estimated using robust maximum likelihood 
(MLR). Explicit academic cheating behaviours were significantly and positively correlated 
with academic MD, and a similar result was found among the two scores of the over-claiming 
measure. Moreover, latency composite and AMD-RRT were negatively correlated, albeit this 
association was weak. All reliability coefficients were at least acceptable. Focusing on 
implicit measures, their reliability coefficients suggested that (especially for AMD-RRT) 
these measures comprised a substantive proportion of reliable variance, and their values were 
higher than what is commonly observed within the empirical literature regarding implicit 
attitudes (Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 





Results from the sensitivity power analysis indicated that the MED for each structural 
regression coefficient on the actual lie behaviour was f 2=.089. The final empirical model 
yielded the following fit: χ2(n=65, df=29)=24.773, p =.690, RMSEA=.000, CFI=1.000, 
TLI=1.050, SRMR=.0692. 
Figure 3 presents completely standardised model estimates. As factor loadings of test 
halves were fixed to unity and their residual terms were constrained to equality within each 
factor, they have the same standardised value. Explicit academic MD was positively 
associated with self-reported academic cheating behaviours (i.e, deliberative behavioural 
criterion). ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT showed a significant and positive association with the 
actual lie behaviour. Overall, the 44% of the variability of the self-reported academic 
cheating behaviour and the 41% of the variability of the actual lie behaviour were explained 
by the independent variables, while the unique incremental contribution of implicit measures 
above and beyond the other independent variables on the familiarity with OC-TN scores was 
approximately the 17% of the criterion variability. In both cases, the effect size associated 
with ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT structural regression coefficients on actual lie behaviour 
overcome the MED highlighted by the sensitivity power analysis. Finally, the actual lie 














The results of Study 2 highlighted two important findings. First, changes made on the 
initial version of AMD-RRT stimuli proposed in Study 1 were effective. Indeed, the average 
latencies associated with the revised stimuli were consistently lower than those observed in 
Study 1, and they were in line (as well as average error percentages) with others observed in 
other studies (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2015). Second, we found, in line with the double 
dissociation model (Perugini, 2005), that the explicit measure of MD was only associated 
with self-reported cheating behaviours, whereas the implicit MD was only associated with 
actual lie behaviour above and beyond the relationship with the IAT measure of cheating 
behaviours. Findings from the final empirical model supported the mutual independence of 
the unique contributions of implicit measures, with respect to that of self-report academic 
MD. Both ACB-IAT and AMD-RRT yielded unique significant contributions in explaining 
the actual lie behaviour. The implicit measures-spontaneous criterion relationships were not 
significant when considering the zero-order correlations, but significant in the SEM. This is 
mostly because in the SEM the relationships are controlled for the measurement error (e.g., 
Meissner et al., 2019). 
Results also showed that the ACB-IAT and the AMD-RRT were completely 
independent. This finding is not surprising, since these measures were designed to tap distinct 
constructs via different measurement paradigms. Specifically, as clarified in the introduction, 
the ACB-IAT is designed to assess the automatic associations between the self and 
misbehaviours, while the AMD-RRT is designed to assess relational information capturing 
the tendency to legitimate specific forms of academic misconducts. However, the specificity 
of the single criterion selected for the Study 2 may lead to premature conclusions regarding 
the validity of the proposed implicit measures. Hence, we designed an additional study to 
replicate these results using a different spontaneous behavioural criterion. 







In this study, we aimed to examine the role of the newly developed measure of implicit 
MD in relation to a spontaneous behavioural criterion assessed following an approach already 
validated (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; von Hippel et al., 2005). Similar to Study 2, we expected 
that while the implicit MD would be associated with cheating behaviours in the task, the 
explicit MD would be associated only with the self-reported misconduct. In addition, we 
expected ACB-IAT to be also associated with cheating behaviours in the task. 
Methods 
 
Procedure and Participants 
 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was not possible to conduct the study in a lab 
environment, and arrangements were made to implement it online. Participants were recruited 
in July 2020 using the web platform Prolific Academic (ProA, http://www.prolific.ac). To 
ensure consistency with Study 1 and 2, participants were required to be based in Italy, to be 
either full or part time students, and to be fluent in Italian. In addition, participants were 
required to complete the tasks by using a laptop or desktop. Sample size was determined a 
priori to ensure an acceptable likelihood to detect the expected effects (i.e, 1 – β=.90 for a 
two-tailed level of α=.01). We relied on the estimates obtained in the Study 2 model and 
determined the minimum sample size using the procedure developed by Satorra and Saris 
(1985) that recommended at least 110 participants. Both implicit and explicit measures were 
administered through the Inquisit 5 Web platform (Millisecond Software, 2020). 
The initial sample included 123 participants, however five were excluded (one was not a 
student, three used a devise other than laptop or desktop and one failed all the attention 
checks). The final sample comprised 118 participants (43.2% females) with a mean age of 
22.7 years (SD=3.3). The majority of the participants were born in Italy (94.1%) and were 
white Caucasians (87.3%). Most of them were full-time students (78.8%), enrolled in an 





undergraduate course (61.9%). Final sample size was constant for all analytic purposes, and 
no subjects were added after the data collection phase. 
Participants anonymously completed both implicit and explicit measures as well as the 
behavioural task and were compensated £4.50 for their time. On average participants needed 
about 39 minutes to complete the tasks. Before starting, participants were informed of the 
general aims of the study and were asked to provide their informed consent. The study was 




All the measures collected were included in the present study. All measures, 
manipulations and exclusions are reported. Measures were presented in the following order: 
1. actual cheating behaviour; 2. implicit measures; 3. explicit measures. 
 
Actual Cheating Behaviour. This was measured by following the computer-based mental- 
arithmetic task originally developed by von Hippel and colleagues (2005; Vohs & Schooler, 
2008). Specifically, participants were presented with a sequence of 19 sums (e.g., 9+3+9– 
19+2=?), one after the other, with the first four aiming to familiarise participants with this 
task. Participants were told that they had 10 seconds to complete each task. They were also 
informed that, due to a ‘computer bug’, the solution of each of the math problems would have 
appeared after 6 seconds unless they have pressed the spacebar. While further underlining in 
the instructions the importance of pressing the bar to prevent the solution to appear, 
participants were also told that the researcher would have not been able to know whether the 
bar was pressed or not. According to the previous studies (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) the 
criterion was defined as the average number of times participants pressed the spacebar across 
the 15 sums. To ensure that higher scores reflected higher cheating, the computed variable 
was multiplied by -1, ranging from -1.00 and 0.00. As per Study 2, also in this case we can 





consider this criterion as reflecting spontaneous behaviour, since the number of spacebar 
presses should not be inflated by explicit components of self-knowledge (von Hippel et al., 
2005) and the task was designed to minimise constraints, effort or premeditation. 
 
 
Academic Cheating Behaviour Implicit Association Test (ACB-IAT). This was the same 
described and used in Study 1 and 2. 
Academic Moral Disengagement Relational Responding Task (AMD-RRT). This task was 
the same described and used in Study 2. 
Explicit Academic Moral Disengagement. This was the same described and used in Study 2. 
Explicit Academic Cheating Behaviours. This measure was the same described and used in 
Study 2. As per Study 2, this measure served as the deliberative criterion. 
Data Analysis 
 
The analytical strategy was the same as Study 2. First, descriptive statistics and 
reliability of the study variables were investigated. Then, the posited SEM was estimated and 









Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the study variables. Given the slight departure 
from univariate normality of one variable, SEM was estimated using MLR as in Study 2. The 
explicit academic cheating behaviours was significantly and positively correlated with the 
explicit academic MD. As expected, while AMD-RRT was significantly associated with the 
behavioural criterion, the ACB-IAT was not. Moreover, latency composite and AMD-IAT 





were positively correlated, albeit this association was weak. All reliability coefficients were 







The final empirical model yielded the following fit: χ2(n=118, df=29)=40.064, p=.007, 
RMSEA=.088, CFI=.942, TLI=.900, SRMR=.084. Figure 5 presents the model standardised 
estimates. As factor loadings of test halves were fixed to unity and their residual terms were 
constrained to equality within each factor, they have the same standardised value. Similar to 
Study 2, explicit academic MD was positively associated with self-reported academic 
cheating behaviours (i.e, deliberative behavioural criterion). While AMD-RRT was 
significantly and positively associated with the spontaneous behavioural criterion, ACB-IAT 
was not significant. 
Overall, the 52% of the variability of the self-reported academic misbehaviour and the 
7% of the variability of the behavioural criterion were explained by the independent variables 









Results from Study 3 confirmed the findings from Study 2 of a double dissociation 
pattern (Perugini, 2005; Perugini & Leone, 2009). Specifically, results showed that while the 
self-reported academic MD was associated only with the self-reported academic misconduct, 
the AMD-RRT was significantly associated only with the behavioural criterion. Results also 





showed a not significant relationship between the self-reported and actual cheating behaviour, 
possibly reflecting the common intention-behaviour gap (Sheeran, 2002). 
Different to Study 2, the ACB-IAT was not associated with the spontaneous behavioural 
criterion. This finding might be attributed to the possible frame-of-reference effects (e.g., 
Schmit et al., 1995). Specifically, since the ACB-IAT measures implicit associations 
concerned with breaking vs. respecting rules within the academic context, it might fail to 
capture aspects of spontaneous behaviour which are not strictly rooted within this context (as 
it was for the spontaneous behaviour measured in Study 2). As in Study 2, ACB-IAT and 
AMD-RRT were fully independent. 
General Discussion 
 
The results of this research support the theorisation of an implicit MD as well as its 
assessment through a newly developed implicit measurement procedure. Consistent with 
double dissociation pattern, results from both Study 2 and 3 showed that only the implicit 
MD was associated with actual cheating behaviour in situations in which one’s own self- 
interest is not clearly at stake, there is no apparent external evaluation, and social desirability 
is minimised. In line with the literature on bounded ethicality, these results suggest that even 
when people know what is ‘the right thing to do’ they may still behave otherwise (e.g., 
Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Chugh et al., 2005; Sezer et al., 2015). This might be the result of 
the automatic activation of traces of memories in which misconduct has been legitimised. In 
other words, the implicit MD represents the automatic component of the mechanisms 
bypassing the self-regulatory system, influencing spontaneous behaviour. With this research, 
we complement the understanding of MD functioning by introducing its implicit counterpart 
and provided the first evidence of the existence of possible automatic MD processes. 
In our study, we found no significant correlations between the implicit and explicit 
components of MD. Although this result needs to be further investigated in future studies, it 





is likely that these two picked two different levels of functioning of MD. Whereas the 
implicit component would capture what might lead an individual to misbehave in situations 
implying on-the-spot decisions, the explicit measure would capture the propensity to adopt 
justification mechanisms in situations characterised by deliberative decisions and moral 
dilemmas. Indeed, as suggested by Nosek and colleagues (2011, p. 154) implicit measures 
‘can reveal effects that are very different from explicit measurement of the same content. 
With this research, we also contributed to the debate on the possible methods to 
operationalise MD. The exclusive use of self-report assessment only enables measurement of 
what individuals think about themselves and are willing or able to report. The adoption of an 
implicit measure allows researchers to overcome these limits and provides a key to access 
individuals’ automatic ‘internal world’. As suggested in the behavioural process model of 
personality (Back et al., 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), individuals might have a positive 
image of themselves (explicit self-concept of personality) and might tend not to attribute to 
themselves the negative elements that might, on the contrary, be implicitly part of them. 
In relation to the broader literature on moral psychology, we have offered a novel 
approach to address the exclusive use of self-report measures when assessing morality. This 
major issue has been highlighted in a recent meta-analysis (Ellemers et al., 2019) suggesting 
that explicit beliefs about one’s own morality are not necessarily sufficient in ensuring 
engagement in moral behaviour. In addition, as suggested by Chugh and Kern (2016, p. 88) 
‘much of our unethical behaviour takes place outside of our awareness’ and when considering 
individuals’ moral conduct the ‘self-view is a more forceful and more automatic influence 
than self-interest on ethical decision-making’. 
Moreover, results of the present research provide further support for the validity of the 
RRT as an implicit measure of psychological constructs and also for a relational conception 
of implicit social-cognitions. From this point of view, a relational implicit measure like the 





RRT is particularly suited to measure complex constructs like MD that cannot be assessed 
with implicit associative measures. 
In our study, there was no significant correlation between the IAT and RRT measures. 
This result suggests that individuals' implicit MD is independent from their implicit moral 
self-concept. This could possibly explain the incongruence between the way individuals 
represent themselves and their tendency to legitimise wrongdoing, hence, why ‘otherwise 
considerate people to commit transgressive acts without experiencing personal distress’ 
(Bandura et al., 2000, p.58). This result could be also due to the different assumptions of 
these two methodologies: while the IAT is based on implicit associative models, the RRT is 
based on an implicit propositional theoretical framework. 
Notwithstanding the innovative contribution of our findings, we are aware of some 
limitations that future studies should address. First, the newly developed implicit measure of 
MD should be tested in different contexts overcoming the possible self-selection bias (e.g., 
the recruitment of students enrolled within a research methods class or in an online research 
platform) that might have affected our research. However, results have been cross-validated 
using two different behavioural criteria. Second, it would be useful to further test the 
concurrent and predictive validity of the implicit MD, considering a wider range of 
misbehaviours, implying a different level of risk for participants’ self-image. It is likely that 
when considering actual misbehaviours characterised by greater cognitive costs, for instance 
in terms of planning or of moral dilemmas, and for which there are potentially serious 
consequences for social and moral self-image, the self-reported MD might have a more 
important role. Third, in line with the literature on moral psychology (e.g., Ellemers et al., 
2019) underlining the need to concurrently examine the role of cognitions and emotions when 
studying transgressive and deviant behaviour, it would be relevant to investigate whether and 
how implicit MD is influenced by emotions when misbehaving. Fourth, future studies should 





investigate the incremental validity of the implicit measure of MD, considering also the role 
of moral standards and norms in situations where these are more or less salient and shared. 
Finally, it would be relevant to investigate the association between implicit and explicit MD. 
In our study, there was no significant correlation, however, this does not exclude the fact that 
it could be possible to identify different configurations of individuals characterised by a range 
of combination of implicit and explicit MD. 
Conclusion 
 
This research contributes to the broader debate of bounded ethicality (e.g., Bazerman & 
Gino, 2012; Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Chugh et al., 2005) by postulating an implicit MD, 
presenting a valid and reliable strategy to assess it, and providing evidence of its association 
with actual misconduct (with two different behavioural spontaneous criteria). Overall, where 
the self-reported MD was only associated with self-reported cheating behaviour, the implicit 
MD was only associated with the actual cheating behaviour. 
Misconduct is still a challenge in the educational context and more in general in our 
society. The results of this research have important implications for the design of training 
aimed at increasing individuals’ moral regulation. In particular, preventing programmes 
should include sessions that help individuals to learn about the role of implicit processes and 
self-reflective in the moral domain. This would in turn allow them to recognise their implicit 
justification mechanisms that redefine the misbehaviour itself, alter the perception of its 
consequences, obscure the individual’s agentic role and hold the victim responsible. 
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1 In this paper the terms “implicit” and “automatic” are used as synonyms to encompass 
unintentional and “less accessible” processes (e.g., Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
2 In line with the Signal Detection Theory (SDT, Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), an 
additional model was tested by operationalising our substantive criterion as the average 
between the proportion of hits and false alarms (i.e, the common-sense approach). This 
scoring procedure provides an index of knowledge exaggeration roughly overlapping the 
criterion location c (Paulhus et al., 2003). Although this model reached an excellent fit to the 
data [χ2(n=65, df=21) = 15.956, p =.772, RMSEA = .000, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.050, SRMR = 
.060], the effects of the implicit measures on the criterion (scored with the common-sense) 
 
were not significant. This result could be due to the fact that the SDT formula, by pooling 
together the proportion of hits and false alarms, does not remove the variance component 
attributable to the proportion of hits from the one related to false alarms. 
